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I. Introduction 
After a major flood there is often special attention to the impacts on vulnerable people and 
members of lower income groups.  But there has been little systematic study of whether the poor 
suffer larger losses, in absolute or proportional terms, than the middle class or high-income 
groups.  It may be that a flood acts like a regressive tax, and worsens income distribution in the 
areas where it strikes. But that cannot be taken for granted. 
There are reasons to expect that floods may worsen economic inequality.  Indigenous groups, 
whose income is generally lower than average, often have settlements on rivers and lakes for 
historical and other reasons.  And in the initial development of a town or city, other things equal 
one would expect that higher income people would locate on higher ground.  The poor in the 
floodplain, where land is cheaper, and the rich on the prize lots at the top of the hill is seen in the 
history of many towns and cities.  However, this is not the whole story.  Rivers and lakes were 
originally very important for transportation and commerce, and in some areas safe locations were 
not close to those important arteries.  Hence, higher income people did not always choose to live 
in completely safe locations.1  And, with the development of dike systems and other forms of 
flood protection it became much safer to locate in what were originally flood zones.  Especially 
when combined with a lack of building lots elsewhere, this could lead to many middle class and 
higher income people moving into a floodplain, as has been the case on a large scale in Greater 
Vancouver, the urban area that we study as an example here.   
Today we are seeing a rising frequency and severity of riverine flooding in many areas around 
the world.  Together with sea level rise, this is causing or will soon cause flooding in areas that 
were previously judged safe because of their human-made protection or because they were above 
natural flood levels along inland waterways or on the coast.  These trends are of course 
associated with the global heating that is causing climate change, and are expected to continue 
and worsen. It is possible that the result may be a change in the distributional impact of the 
“flood tax”, making it more onerous but also more equally shared. 
The first economic impact of flooding that one thinks of is property damage.  Homes, businesses 
and public assets may all be damaged.  In the case of homes and businesses one of course thinks 
of the impact on the owners.  But others, for example tenants, will be affected too.   Also some of 
this damage may be to “lifelines” - -  transportation, water systems, electricity and other utilities 
- - which affect people irrespective of who owns the infrastructure.  Most other damage may 
have distributional effects, including that to public facilities like schools and hospitals, which 
may result in interruption of important public services.    
As if the damage to physical assets was not complex enough, there is a range of other impacts 
that can have distributional effects.   These include temporary or permanent job loss, loss of 
business income or rent, physical or mental health impacts, increased cost of goods and services, 
costs of travel and accommodation if evacuated, and so on.  While there have been many post-
                                                          
1 It is not entirely unusual to see impressive homes dating from the first half of the nineteenth century or earlier 
along the banks of the St. John River in New Brunswick or the St. Lawrence River in Quebec.  When those homes 
were built, they were evidently in the most advantageous location for the time, despite the risk of flooding.  
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flood surveys that identify the existence of these indirect costs, we are not aware of any case in 
which the distribution of these costs across households according to their income has been 
estimated or recorded. 
Flood damage may be offset by insurance payouts or by government compensation. How this 
would occur differs greatly between countries.  In France, for example, flood insurance is a 
mandatory element of home insurance policies.2  Next door, in Germany, there is no compulsion 
to have flood insurance and there is some government compensation. In the US, it is mandatory 
to have flood insurance, either under the National Flood Insurance Program or privately, if one 
has a federally insured mortgage and is located in a high-risk flood zone.  In Canada, private 
overland flood insurance was not available and there was only the government’s disaster 
financial assistance (DFA) – a form of free insurance that is subject to caps and the ineligibility 
of a range of damages, as described below.  Today, quite a number of insurance companies are 
offering coverage, but only 34% of households had private flood insurance at last report 
(Insurance Bureau of Canada, 2019).  The remainder, and all of those in high-risk flood zones 
where private insurance is not available, continue to have free coverage under the public scheme.   
This paper tries to illustrate and illuminate the above aspects through a case study, that of 
possible future flooding in Greater Vancouver or simply “Vancouver” for short.3 Vancouver is a 
city of about two million people located on Canada’s west coast. It is the country’s main Pacific 
port and the commercial and industrial hub of the province of British Columbia.  Located at the 
mouth of the Fraser River, about 20% of its people and 18% of its economic activity are located 
in the river’s floodplain, protected by dikes (Gertz, Davies and Black, 2019).  The city also has a 
long oceanfront and concerns about future coastal flooding are growing.  Vancouver allows an 
interesting case study displaying challenges shared by many other modern and dynamic cities 
worldwide that face an increasing threat of flooding.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we review some previous 
studies on distributional aspects of flooding.  Then in section 3 we discuss conceptual issues and 
our theoretical approach to studying distributional impacts of flooding.  Section 4 presents the 
data that form the foundation for our analysis of the impacts of a hypothetical flood that would 
inundate the entire Vancouver floodplain.  It also describes the DFA rules that would determine 
how public compensation was paid out after such a flood.  Results for the Vancouver case are 
shown in Section 5.  Section VI concludes. 
  
                                                          
2 See Sandink et al. (2016) and Insurance Bureau of Canada (2019) for details on the French system and that in the 
other countries mentioned in this paragraph. 
3 Greater Vancouver has 21 municipalities and one treaty First Nation.  The City of Vancouver is one of the 
municipalities.  Throughout this paper, we use “Vancouver” to refer to Greater Vancouver. 
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II. Distributional Aspects of Previous Major Urban Flooding 
Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in August 2005.  Total economic damage has been 
estimated at $149 billion (Hallegatte, 2008) and at least 1,833 people were killed during the 
hurricane and subsequent flooding (Knabb et al., 2005). Large numbers in the poorer areas of the 
city were permanently displaced.  It has been found that the residents of damaged areas were 
more likely to be black, unemployed, and living below the poverty line than those in areas 
without direct damage (Logan, 2006).  Despite aid, the poorest and most vulnerable communities 
were never able to rebuild or return (Greenberg 2014).  Tenants were disadvantaged after the 
flood as many rental properties were not repaired quickly, leading to a spike in rental prices 
(Gotham 2014).  There was also a correlation between poverty and lack of flood insurance 
(Masozera et al. 2007). 
At the end of October 2012 Hurricane Sandy (known informally as Superstorm Sandy) travelled 
up the eastern seaboard of the U.S., causing $65 billion in damage and killing 71 people.  The 
impact was particularly severe in and around New York City. A spike in unemployment 
insurance applications was reported after the storm, but within four weeks UI applications were 
back to normal (United States Department of Commerce, 2013). Cohen and Liboiron (2014) 
report that tenants, immigrants, and people of colour struggled to repair their homes after Sandy 
due to a slow governmental grant process and that repairs to public housing were also slow.  
Turning to Europe, risk management of flooding has often been based on cost-benefit analysis 
(Allaire, 2018). In the UK, government has decided which areas to allow to flood in order to 
spare others using a cost-benefit approach that has been criticized for not taking into account 
social vulnerabilities (Johnson et al., 2007).  Persons with vulnerabilities have been found to be 
over-represented in ocean floodplains although not in river floodplains (Walker and Burningham, 
2011).  Cost-benefit analysis is not dominant everywhere, however.  The Netherlands, for 
example, has focused on minimizing loss of life instead of cost-benefit analyses (Bouma et al. 
2005). 
In Canada, Simonovic (1999) found that the 1997 Winnipeg flood strategy was based on a cost-
benefit analysis that did not adequately account for social vulnerabilities. The 2013 Calgary 
flood affected many wealthy residential areas and business centres (Cryderman, 2014). However, 
it has also been reported that several vulnerable population subgroups were affected in ways not 
experienced by others. Those who were homeless or on the verge of homelessness had a harder 
time finding shelter due to the increased demand for temporary residence and the reduction of 
housing availability (Van Rassel, 2014).4 The indigenous community of the Sikiska Nation, 
located downriver from Calgary, was disproportionately affected by the flood. One in four 
residents needed to be evacuated as opposed to one in ten in Calgary. A majority of the houses 
lost access to safe water and the roads and sewage infrastructure were affected. In the 
reconstruction efforts, this community experienced further upheaval as the reconstructed houses 
                                                          
4 The Canadian Disaster Database reports that an estimated 100,000 people were evacuated during the Calgary 
area flooding.  
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were built in areas that did not coincide with the historical and cultural traditions, causing stress 
within the community (Patrick, 2017).  
While Vancouver has not experienced a significant flood since 1948, it has been the subject of 
flood vulnerability studies due to its high flood risk. Oulahen et al. (2015a) produce social 
vulnerability indicators based on a household’s risk factors and then use this index to create 
maps of social vulnerability for five cities in Metro Vancouver.5 These maps illustrate the 
distributional aspect of flooding where the aftermath of a flood would be felt differently across 
the population depending on their vulnerability. Oulahen et al. (2015b) highlight another 
distributional aspect of flooding in Vancouver where new building regulations and property 
insurance requirements are not affordable to many people living in the floodplains and thus 
expose low-income people to higher potential damage in the event of a flood. 
 
III. Conceptual Issues and Theoretical Approach 
Distributional shocks can occur on the sources or uses sides of households’ budget constraints.   
There can be uses side effects in the form of price increases during the period of a flood, or the 
unavailability of certain goods and services.  We will refer to such impacts as a form of flood 
damage in the discussion here.  Sources side effects can take the form of loss of income, insurance 
payouts or receipt of government assistance, and loss of asset value.   
What time period to use in framing the analysis is always a question in distributional studies.  If 
there were a perfect capital market and people were assumed to have utility functions defined over 
the expected path of consumption over the lifetime, one could use the lifetime as the period of 
analysis.  In that framework, the welfare of an individual or family depends on lifetime income, L, 
composed of human wealth, H, lifetime transfer entitlements, T, and initial net worth, W: 
(1)   L = H + T + W  
where H and T are net of direct taxes and important components of W include housing or home 
equity, E, and business equity B.  People would be free to choose any lifetime consumption plan 
with present value not exceeding L, and would smooth consumption overtime by borrowing or 
saving. In other words, the life-cycle model of consumption (LCM) would describe their 
behaviour.  
Flood shocks to lifetime income can come in various forms.  One is simply income interruption 
during a flood and the recovery period from a flood, which reduces H and B a little.  More serious 
may be uninsured damage to one’s home, other real estate assets or business assets.  Still more 
                                                          
5 The indicators are based on ability to cope, ethnicity, access to resources, household arrangement, and built 
environment. These characteristics have been demonstrated to impact a household’s ability to recover from a 
flood or natural disaster event. 
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serious could be loss of H due to illness or injury.  Income losses could lead to partial compensation 
in the form of more T - - e.g. through employment insurance (EI) or welfare payments.6 
While it may be possible to estimate the size of flood-related shocks to earnings and assets, 
estimating total lifetime income is difficult in part since it depends on expected future income 
flows. If one wanted to say what % of L had been lost due to flooding, estimates could be made, 
but they would be subject to a significant margin of error.  One must also take into consideration 
that about 20% of the population is borrowing constrained (Hall and Mishkin, 1982; Mariger, 
1987; Jappelli, 1990)7 and banking services may be interrupted or hard to access during a flood. 
Hence, while it seems appropriate to treat the majority of people as LCM consumers, we should 
keep in mind that there are a significant number of people whose behaviour does not follow that 
model.  
Fortunately, there is an approach to distributional analysis in the flood context that makes sense 
both for people who can still validly be modelled as life-cycle savers in the context of a flood and 
for those who can’t. This is to direct attention at consumption impacts, and distribution of 
consumption, in the year of the flood.8  It is true that for the life-cycle savers there will also be 
consumption impacts in future years, due to consumption smoothing, but even borrowing 
constrained people may have lasting consumption impacts, if the flood has a lasting effect on their 
incomes or assets. Deciding to set aside all impacts beyond the current year is a practical approach 
that focuses attention on a valid measure of current welfare, that is current consumption. It will 
not tell us everything about distributional impacts, but it should nevertheless be informative.       
As set out in the next section we use 2011 census data in our case study for Vancouver.  Since 
the census does not include consumption data we get a number for normal, i.e. pre-flood, 
consumption by estimating lifetime income and applying a simple version of the LCM.  Since 
the census only has cross-section data this would be difficult to do on an individual or household 
basis, as we only have a one-year snapshot of income received.  Hence, we prefer to average 
within census tracts.  As outlined below, each census tract has about 5,000 people.  Averaging 
incomes within a census tract gives a reasonable estimate of permanent income, providing us 
with a basis to estimate average lifetime income in a tract.  Those estimates provide a basis for 
distributional analysis that would be absent with individual or household data, and also prevent 
us from being misled by transitory income components, which result in inequality in annual 
income considerably exceeding that in lifetime income.   
                                                          
6 In Canada, government disaster financial assistance (DFA) programs do not cover loss of income, so T does not 
get a boost from DFA.  DFA that is paid to compensate for loss of B or E is included in the net impact on those 
forms of equity, rather than being counted here as an explicit transfer payment.   
7 These early studies estimated borrowing constraints given data on consumption. Later studies confirm that the 
percentage of the population that is borrowing constrained has remained roughly 20% (Gross and Souleles, 2002; 
Gorbachev and Dobra, 2009; Kim, Wilmarth, and Choi, 2016). 
8 Looking at consumption over the period of a year is somewhat arbitrary.  It might be argued, for instance, that we 
should look at consumption over a shorter period, even just the flood and recovery period.  However, the available 
income data are for a calendar year, and we do not have a good basis for estimating inequality in income or 
consumption over shorter periods.    
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The importance of averaging income within census tracts can be highlighted by considering the 
simple case in which the population within a census tract is homogeneous except that individuals 
and households differ in their transitory income.  If they were all life-cycle consumers and all 
lost, say, 15% of the value of their home and contents after DFA compensation, there would be 
no true distributional effect within a census tract.  However, with transitory incomes there would 
be inequality in annual income and losses would be larger as a % of measured income for lower 
income people, making it appear that flood damage to homes and contents had a disequalizing 
effect.  With a population of forward-looking consumers mostly not subject to borrowing 
constraints, this would be highly misleading if the goal is to determine the effects on true 
economic inequality.   
 
IV. Vancouver: Data and Disaster Financial Assistance Rules 
Data  
We use 2011 Census data for Greater Vancouver, which includes 453 census tracts that have an 
average population of 5,023 people.  Of these census tracts, 46 are entirely in the floodplain 
while 41 are partly in the floodplain.  We estimate that the total population residing in the 
floodplain is 436,640 while 1,838,985 people live outside the floodplain (Table 1).  We divide 
the census tracts that are partially in the floodplain into the portions in and outside the flood 
plain, resulting in a total of 494 groups.  Each of those groups can be further divided into owner 
and renter households. 
Table 1 provides information on the characteristics of the 494 groups that we study.  Mean 
income per person is very similar in the floodplain ($40,494) vs. outside ($40,420).  However, 
the distribution of income across census groups differs – it is more equal in the floodplain.  The 
fraction of persons living in groups with mean income less than $30,000 is only 9.9% in the 
floodplain but it is 17.2% outside the floodplain.  And there is a similar difference at the top:  
4.2% of those living in the floodplain are in census groups with mean income greater than 
$60,000 while that fraction is 8.4% outside the floodplain.  Thus, it is not the case that low 
income people are over-represented in the floodplain, but it is true that high income people are 
under-represented there.   
Looking at other characteristics, the floodplain and non-floodplain populations are quite similar 
in terms of household size, unemployment rate, % living in one-person households and average 
age.  The small differences in these dimensions are that the floodplain population is slightly 
younger, has a few more people living in one-person households, has a lower unemployment 
rate, and has lower average household size.  The largest difference is that one-person households 
are more common in the lowest income group in the floodplain (38.9%) than outside the 
floodplain (29.6%).  Unemployment is also significantly lower for this income group in the 
floodplain (5.5% vs. 7.8%). 
The most significant difference between the floodplain and non-floodplain populations for our 
purposes is that there is a considerably higher rate of home ownership in the floodplain: 77% vs. 
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67%.  There is a difference in the same direction of at least 5% points in all income groups.  This 
may reflect reluctance on the part of developers to build apartment buildings in the floodplain. 
Following Gertz, Davies and Black (2019) we will consider a flood that inundates the entire 
floodplain, causing physical damage equal in value to 25% of the capital stock located there.9  
For simplicity, we will assume that neither households nor firms expect the flood and they do not 
expect it to be repeated.   In the Vancouver case this is not unreasonable, as the floodplains are 
all diked and there has not been a really major flood since 1948.  Also, it is reasonable to assume 
that if such a devastating flood did occur, people would expect the dikes and other flood 
protection to be rebuilt to a higher standard, making the likelihood of a future flood that would 
overcome the flood defences even smaller than it is now.  
As explained in the previous section we use a simple version of the life-cycle model (LCM) to 
predict pre-flood or normal consumption.  The average age of the population is close to 40 in all 
groups, so for simplicity we assume a uniform average age of 40 in our calculations.  We also 
assume that everyone will retire at age 65 and die at age 85 with certainty. Expected future 
income equals current income.   
We need to make an assumption about the borrowing ability of the representative household in 
each census group.  Since being borrowing constrained is atypical, we assume that the 
representative household in each group can borrow, but we also recognize that there are certain 
consumption shocks during the flood and recovery period that cannot simply be offset by 
borrowing.  Effectively, what happens is that prices for certain goods and services go up or they 
become unavailable, which is equivalent to their price going to infinity.  To explain this fully one 
needs to recognize, that people consume Beckerian “commodities” that are produced with inputs 
of goods and their own time (Becker, 1965).  The commodities that are particularly time 
intensive are those that we recognize as home production.  Meals, for example, are produced in 
the home using food and appliances, utilities and time spent obtaining food, storing it, cooking, 
cleaning up afterwards and so on.  When there is a flood, electricity and other utilities are likely 
to be unavailable.  A proper cooked meal may simply become unavailable, or may only be found 
after making a difficult journey to a restaurant outside the flood zone and paying restaurant 
prices for a meal that would normally be produced at a lower cost at home.  The cost of a wide 
range of other commodities normally produced and consumed in the home may also rise 
considerably, or become prohibitive.   
Here we capture the effect of prices rising and goods and services becoming unavailable by 
assuming that some of the consumption shocks caused by a flood are “non-smoothable”.  We 
                                                          
9 The assumption of 25% damage is not extreme.  The Gertz et al. estimate of total capital damage of $14.6 billion in 
this case is similar to the number found by and the Fraser Basin Council (201X).   Inundation of the entire floodplain 
could occur e.g. if there were a major earthquake - - something that Vancouver is believed to be “due“ for.  A major 
earthquake would likely cause multiple dike failures throughout the Fraser delta.  Widespread flooding could also 
occur as a result of unusually heavy winter snowfall in the Fraser River catchment area combined with a rapid thaw 
and heavy rainfall during the spring freshet.  In the future these threats are likely to be magnified by sea level rise, 
especially if flood defences are not improved sufficiently.   
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assume that these non-smoothable costs are partly a fixed amount common to all households and 
partly related to income, as described below.   
While the value of homes is reported in the census, and we can impute mortgage debt using the 
results of the 2012 Survey of Financial Security (SFS), the value of home contents is not given in 
either of these sources. Evidence on the value of home contents in Canada is difficult to obtain, 
but the Association of British Insurers (ABI) reports the average value of contents.  Their 
number is close to mean household income in the UK, so we have assumed that the value of 
home contents is equal to a year’s household income in our calculations.10  We assume that ratio 
holds in Vancouver.  
 
Disaster Financial Assistance in British Columbia 
The BC DFA program pays for 80% of total eligible damage exceeding $1,000 up to a maximum 
of $300,000.  There are three types of recipients: home owners and tenants, small businesses and 
farm owners, and charitable organizations. Eligible expenses include damage to principal 
residences, and business or charitable premises as well as essential contents.  For homes, eligible 
items are stipulated item-by-item and room-by-room.  Casual labour used in cleanup, including 
the owner’s own time, is also covered, at the minimum wage, up to 100 hours.  Commercial 
services and rentals for cleanup are eligible at officially approved rates.  Ineligible items include 
income loss (both labour earnings and business income) and many non-essential contents, 
including e.g. jewellery, art, books, collectables, and recreation equipment.  Loss of land value 
and damage to roads are not eligible.  Based on these limitations, we assume in the calculations 
reported below that only 50% of home contents and “non-smoothable” consumption shocks are 
covered by DFA in Vancouver.  We also impose the $300,000 cap on total DFA payments.  
Including condominiums, the average sale price of a home in Vancouver in recent years has been 
about $1 million, and detached houses sell for an average of around $1.5 million (Globe and 
Mail, July 4, 2019).  This might suggest that a great deal of damage to homes is not covered by 
BC’s DFA program.  However, that is incorrect.  Most of the cost of a home in Vancouver 
reflects the cost of land.  Dachis and Thivierge (2018) present results that imply the average 
construction cost of a new single-family house home in Vancouver in 2011 was $419,000, which 
was only 32.3% of the average $1,298,000 price of such a home at the time.11    
 
                                                          
10The Association of British Insurers reports that in 2018 the average value of home contents in the UK was GBP 
35,000 https://www.abi.org.uk/news/news-articles/2018/02/britain-uncovered-the-average-uk-household-now-owns-
35000-worth-of-stuff/  Mean household disposable income was reported as GBP 34,200 by Britain’s Office for 
National Statistics: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/bulletins/
householddisposableincomeandinequality/yearending2018       
11 The construction cost can be calculated from the numbers in Table 1 of Dachis and Thivierge (2018) and the two 
equations involving MPCC that appear in the text of the second paragraph of the Appendix to their paper, noting 
that EP, which reflects the margin developers earn as profit (17%, reported on p.8), equals 1.17 and the cost of 
barriers is $644,000 (last column of Table 1).   
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V. Vancouver Flood Study: Results 
We present results here on the estimated direct distributional impacts on households of a flood 
that would inundate the entire floodplain of Greater Vancouver causing 25% damage to all 
houses and their contents.  This includes income interruption and consumption losses that may 
result from damage to businesses or public facilities, but the distributional impact of losses of 
business equity are not considered since we cannot estimate those using the 2011 census data.12   
Our first results are for the case where there is damage to houses and their contents only.  The 
estimated effects of income interruption and “non-smoothable” consumption losses will be 
shown subsequently.  Table 2 shows these results for Vancouver as a whole.  The starting point, 
shown in the first column, is a no-flood distribution of consumption with a share of the top 
quintile (i.e. top 20% of persons) of 30.83% and a share of the bottom quintile equal to 12.81%.  
The Gini coefficient is just 0.1791, reflecting the fact that we are not including inequality within 
the owner or renter subgroups of our census groups. Mean consumption, found by imposing the 
simple life-cycle model described in the previous section, is $36,110 per person.   
Table 2 shows that the distributional impacts of flooding are small, with or without 
compensation, when the only cost is damage to houses and contents.  The small size of impact is 
due to the fact that there are two conflicting effects, neither of which is very large.  The first is an 
increase in consumption inequality between people in the floodplain and those outside it.  The 
second is a small decrease in consumption inequality within the floodplain due to the fact that the 
rate of home ownership is significantly lower in the lower income groups (Table 1).   The small 
impact of DFA compensation is due to the fact that it weakens both of these effects. 
Table 3 shows the effects in the floodplain only, again considering only damage to houses and 
contents.  In this case we expect inequality to fall, due to home ownership rates being lower for 
lower income groups.  That is indeed what is found, with the Gini coefficient declining from 
0.1395 to 0.1391.  Compensation almost completely removes those effects, showing that it is 
slightly disequalizing because of the higher home ownership rate among higher income groups. 
The flood acts like a mildly progressive wealth tax, and DFA compensation mostly wipes out 
that “tax”.       
The relatively small impact of damage to houses and contents either on inequality between the 
floodplain and the rest of the city, or within the floodplain, owes much to the assumption at this 
point that all residents are behaving according to the life-cycle model of consumption (LCM).  
Equity in housing plus the value of contents is, on average, a small fraction of lifetime income.  
Moreover, the 25% damage is just to the housing structure.  Most of the value of a typical house 
in Vancouver in 2011 was the value of the land, which we assume is unaffected by the flood 
since it is not expected that the flood damage will recur.  In the absence of compensation, the 
                                                          
12 For a full analysis it might be argued that one should consider the distributional impact of the increase in future 
taxes needed to pay for repairs to public facilities.  Those costs would mostly be paid for by the provincial 
government, with a large subsidy from the federal DFAA program.  Hence the impact on Vancouver residents would 
be relatively small.   
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estimated reduction in average lifetime income, and therefore in consumption under the LCM, 
for households in the floodplain is just 3.1% without compensation and 0.9% with compensation.   
Table 4 shows the estimated distributional impacts for Vancouver as a whole when “non-
smoothable” consumption costs are included.  As mentioned earlier, we assume that these costs 
have a fixed component, common to all households and a component that is related to household 
income. In the run shown in Table 4, the fixed component equals one month’s average 
consumption, $2,917, and the second component equals one month’s income for the household, 
which averages $3,009.   
Recall that in Table 2, when we did not have “non-smoothable” consumption losses, inequality 
changed very little for Vancouver as a whole.  With those additional losses included, however, 
inequality increases noticeably, especially when there is no compensation.  This is mainly 
because the gap between people in the floodplain and those outside the floodplain rises more due 
to the flood than it did without the “non-smoothable” consumption losses.  Table 5 shows that 
the flood is now predicted to decrease average consumption in the floodplain in the year of the 
flood by $6,648, or 19%.  But we also see that inequality within the floodplain now increases.  
Without compensation the Gini coefficient for consumption in the floodplain goes up from 
0.1395 to 0.1426.  And we now find that DFA compensation reduces inequality within the 
floodplain, in contrast to the case without “non-smoothable” consumption costs in which the 
compensation actually increased inequality in the floodplain.  The explanation is that we are now 
recognizing the greater vulnerability of low income people, which means that the flood can no 
longer be looked on as a kind of progressive wealth tax.  It now resembles the combination of a 
regressive income or consumption tax with a progressive wealth tax, in which the regressive 
element dominates.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
We have discussed the complex distributional impacts of flooding in a Canadian context.  In 
addition to damage to capital, floods cause interruption of income, public services, health care, 
and the supply of consumer goods. The may of course also cause death and injury, including 
damage to mental health.  Experience in Canada and other countries shows that impacts on lower 
income and vulnerable populations are often especially severe.   
We have illustrated the possible distributional impacts of flooding through a case study of a 
hypothetical flood in the Vancouver area which would destroy 25% of the capital located in the 
floodplain.  The modeling uses 2011 Census data and is based in the dynamic general 
equilibrium analysis in Gertz et al. (2018).  We include income interruption and consumption 
losses but are unable to study the impact of the loss of business equity as it is not covered in the 
census.  “Non-economic” impacts have also not been modelled. 
In our first set of runs we assumed that although there were consumption losses, those could be 
smoothed over time by all households.  With that assumption the distributional impacts of 
flooding either for Metro Vancouver as a whole or the floodplain alone are small, with or 
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without disaster assistance.  These results are altered when we taken into account borrowing 
constraints and barriers to securing goods and services during and immediately after a flood, 
introducing “non-smoothable” consumption losses. With this feature, if there was no disaster 
assistance the flood would increase inequality significantly both in Metro Vancouver as a whole 
and in the floodplain alone.  When the Disaster Financial Assistance system is introduced most 
of that increase in inequality is reversed.    
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Metro Vancouver Population Characteristics, 2011 
Group 
Mean 
Income ($ 
thousands) 
Population Income 
per 
person 
($) 
Value of 
Dwelling, 
Owners 
($) 
Owners as 
% of 
Households 
Unemployment 
Rate 
% of One-
person 
Households 
Mean 
Age 
I. In the Floodplain 
< 30 43,340 27,168 645,132 68 5.5 38.9 36.9 
30-40 197,740 34,540 588,784 71 7.6 26.3 40.4 
40-50 138,840 44,548 642,004 84 7.1 32.5 39.7 
50-60 38,270 54,292 815,074 87 6.6 16.6 41.1 
60+ 18,450 76,727 1,182,466 86 7.2 26.5 40.1 
TOTAL 436,640 40,494 666,022 77 7.1 29.4 39.9 
II. Outside the Floodplain 
< 30 316,335 27,134 539,664 53 7.8 29.6 40.6 
30-40 730,240 34,799 600,448 66 7.2 30.5 40.1 
40-50 493,140 44,028 650,716 71 7.4 23.3 41.1 
50-60 145,215 52,305 919,136 70 7.0 24.9 40.0 
60+ 154,055 72,922 1,414,504 80 6.8 26.9 40.4 
TOTAL 1,838,985 40,420 716,330 67 7.3 27.8 41.5 
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Table 2:  Hypothetical Vancouver Distributional Flood Impacts on Consumption Per 
Person: Damage to Houses & Contents Only 
Indicator No Flood Flood with 25% 
Damage and no 
Compensation 
Flood with 25% 
Damage and DFA 
Compensation 
Quintile 1 % share 12.81 12.84 12.82 
Quintile 2 % share 15.97 15.94 15.96 
Quintile 3 % share 18.71 18.67 18.70 
Quintile 4 % share 21.68 21.68 21.68 
Quintile 5 % share 30.83 30.87 30.84 
Gini Coefficient 0.1791 0.1793 0.1792 
Mean ($) 36,110 35,960 36,067 
Median ($) 33,907 33,680 33,866 
 
 
Table 3: Vancouver Distributional Flood Impacts on Consumption Per Person, Damage to 
Houses and Contents, Floodplain Only 
Indicator No Flood Flood Without 
Compensation 
Flood With DFA 
Compensation 
Quintile 1 % share 14.11 14.11 14.13 
Quintile 2 % share 16.94 16.90 16.92 
Quintile 3 % share 19.38 19.34 19.37 
Quintile 4 % share 21.52 21.50 21.52 
Quintile 5 % share 28.06 28.08 28.06 
Gini Coefficient 0.1395 0.1391 0.1395 
Mean ($) 35,396 34,311 35,084 
Median ($) 34,419 33,229 34,090 
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Table 4: Vancouver Distributional Flood Impacts Including “Non-smoothable” Costs 
 
Indicator No Flood Flood Without 
Compensation 
Flood With DFA 
Compensation 
Quintile 1 % share 12.81 12.69 12.84 
Quintile 2 % share 15.97 15.77 15.90 
Quintile 3 % share 18.71 18.49 18.60 
Quintile 4 % share 21.68 21.78 21.68 
Quintile 5 % share 30.83 31.26 30.97 
Gini Coefficient 0.1791 0.1851 0.1805 
Mean ($) 36,110 35,194 35,696 
Median ($) 33,907 32,426 33,243 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Vancouver Distributional Flood Impacts Including “Non-smoothable” Costs,  
Floodplain Only 
 
Indicator No Flood Flood Without 
Compensation 
Flood With DFA 
Compensation 
Quintile 1 % share 14.11 14.13 14.17 
Quintile 2 % share 16.94 16.85 16.89 
Quintile 3 % share 19.38 19.16 19.27 
Quintile 4 % share 21.52 21.37 21.45 
Quintile 5 % share 28.06 28.49 28.22 
Gini Coefficient 0.1395 0.1426 0.1404 
Mean ($) 35,396 28,748 32,391 
Median ($) 34,419 27,528 31,556 
 
 
  
14 
 
References 
Allaire, M. (2018). “Socio-economic impacts of flooding: A review of the empirical literature”, 
Water Security, 3, 18-26. 
Becker, Gary S. (1965), “A Theory of the Allocation of Time”, The Economic Journal, 75: 493-
517. 
Bouma, Jan Jaap, Delphine Francois, and Peter Troch, “Risk assessment and water 
management," Environmental Modelling & Software, 2005, 20 (2), 141-151.  
Cryderman, Kelly. (2014, April 27) “Almost a year after the Alberta flood, housing market yet to 
recover”, The Globe and Mail. 
Cohen and Liboiron. (2014, October 30) “New York’s Two Sandys", Metro Politics. 
 
Dachis, Benjamin and Vincent Thivierge (2018), “Through the Roof: The High Cost of Barriers 
to Building New Housing in Canadian Municipalities”, C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 513, 
May. 
Davies, J. B. (2016). Economic analysis of the costs of flooding. Canadian Water Resources 
Journal, 41(1-2), 204–219. 
 
Fraser Basin Council. (2014). Flood on the Fraser. Vancouver, Canada: Author. Retrieved from 
https://www.fraserbasin.bc.ca/water_flood_fraser.html 
 
Fraser Basin Council. (2016). Lower mainland flood management strategy: Phase 1 summary 
report. Vancouver, Canada: Author. Retrieved from https://www.fraserbasin.bc.ca/_Library/ 
Water_Flood_Strategy/FBC_LMFMS_Phase_1_Report_Web_May_2016.pdf 
 
Gertz, Aaron B., James B. Davies and Samantha L. Black (2019), “A CGE Framework for 
Modeling the Economics of Flooding and Recovery in a Major Urban Area”, Risk Analysis 39 
(6): 1314-1341. 
Government of British Columbia (2015). Disaster financial assistance: Guidelines for private 
sector. Surrey, Canada: Emergency Management BC. 
 
Government of Canada (2014), Disaster financial assistance arrangements. 
Retrieved from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rcvr-dsstrs/dsstr-fnnclssstnc- 
rrngmnts/index-eng.aspx 
Grant, Charles (2007), “Estimating Credit Constraints Among US Households”, Oxford 
Economic Papers 59 (4): 583-605. 
Gorbachev, O., & Dogra, K. (2009). “Evolution of Consumption Volatility for the Liquidity 
Constrained Households over 1983 to 2004” (No. 193). Edinburgh School of Economics, 
University of Edinburgh. 
15 
 
Gotham (2014), “Reinforcing inequalities: the impact of the CDBG program on post-Katrina 
rebuilding," Housing Policy Debate, 24 (1), 192-212. 
Greenberg, Miriam (2014), “The Disaster inside the Disaster Hurricane Sandy and Post-crisis 
Redevelopment," New Labor Forum, 23: 44-52. 
Gross, D. B., & Souleles, N. S. (2002). “Do liquidity constraints and interest rates matter for 
consumer behavior? Evidence from credit card data.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
117(1), 149-185. 
 
Hall, R.E. and Mishkin, F.S. (1982) “The sensitivity of consumption to transitory income: 
estimates from panel data on households”, Econometrica, 50: 461–81. 
 
Hallegatte, S. (2008), “An adaptive regional input-output model and its application to the 
assessment of the economic cost of Katrina,” Risk Analysis, 28(3): 779–799. 
 
Insurance Bureau of Canada. 2019. Options for Managing Flood Costs of Canada’s Highest Risk 
Residential Properties. Report of the National Working Group on Financial Risk of Flooding. 
Toronto, ON: Insurance Bureau of Canada.  http://assets.ibc.ca/Documents/Studies/IBC-Flood-
Options-Paper-EN.pdf  retrieved August 12, 2019. 
 
Jappelli, T. (1990), “Who is credit constrained in the US economy?”, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 94: 219–34. 
 
Johnson, Clare, Edmund Penning-Roswell, and Dennis Parker (2007), “Natural and imposed 
injustices: the challenges in implementing fair flood risk management policy in England," The 
Geographical Journal, 173 (4), 374-390. 
Kim, K. T., Wilmarth, M. J., and S. Choi (2016), “Credit use of US households after the Great 
Recession: The role of credit constraint”. Family and Consumer Sciences Research Journal, 
44(3), 280-294. 
Knabb, Richard D; Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, (2005). ”Hurricane Katrina: August 
23 – 30, 2005, Tropical Cyclone Report,” United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration's National Weather Service.  
Logan, John R (2006), “The impact of Katrina: Race and class in storm-damaged 
neighborhoods," Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences, Brown University, 16. 
Mariger, R.P. (1987), “A life-cycle consumption model with liquidity constraints: theory 
and empirical results”, Econometrica, 55: 533–57. 
Masozera, Michel, Melissa Bailey, and Charles Kerchner (2007), “Distribution of impacts of 
natural disasters across income groups: A case study of New Orleans," Ecological Economics, 63 
(2), 299-306. 
16 
 
Oulahen, G., L. Mortsch, K. Tang, and D. Harford (2015a). “Unequal vulnerability to flood 
hazards: ‘ground truthing’ a social vulnerability index of five municipalities in Metro 
Vancouver, Canada”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 105(3): 473-495. 
Oulahen, G., D. Shrubsole, and G. McBean (2015b). “Determinants of residential vulnerability 
to flood hazards in Metro Vancouver, Canada”, Natural Hazards, 78(2): 939-956. 
Patrick, R. B. (2018). “Social and cultural impacts of the 2013 Bow River flood at Siksika 
Nation, Alberta, Canada”, Indigenous Policy Journal, 28(3). 
Sandink, Dan, Paul Kovacs, Greg Oulahen and Dan Shrubsole (2016), “Public relief and insurance for residential flood losses in Canada: Current status and commentary”, Canadian 
Water Resources Journal / Revue canadienne des ressources hydriques, 41 (1–2): 220–237. 
 
Simonovic, Slobodan P. (1999), “Social criteria for evaluation of flood control measures: 
Winnipeg case study," Urban Water, 1 (2), 167-175. 
United States Department of Commerce. (2013). Economic impact of hurricane Sandy: Potential 
economics activity lost and gained in New Jersey and New York. Economics and Statistics 
Administration Office of the Chief Economist, Department of Commerce. 
 
Van Rassel (2014, June 24) “Flood book shows effect of disaster on city’s homeless,” Calgary 
Herald. 
 
Walker, Gordon and Kate Burningham (2011), “Flood risk, vulnerability and environmental 
justice: Evidence and evaluation of inequality in a UK context," Critical Social Policy, 31 (2): 
216-240. 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
